标题： 带有承诺的信令 显示英文标题

标题： Signaling With Commitment

摘要： 我们研究规范的信号传递博弈，赋予发送者承诺能力。 我们提供了发送者可实现收益的几何表征，该表征由与不同发送者行动相关的发送者中期收益函数图的拓扑连接所描述。 我们将这种情况下发送者的收益与两个基准进行比较。 在第一个基准中，除了对其行动进行承诺外，发送者还可以承诺向接收者提供额外的信息。 在第二个基准中，发送者只能承诺披露信息，但不能对其行动进行承诺。 我们通过工作市场信号传递、具有说谎成本的通信以及披露等应用来说明我们的结果。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We study the canonical signaling game, endowing the sender with commitment power. We provide a geometric characterization of the sender's attainable payoffs, described by the topological join of the graphs of the sender's interim payoff functions associated with different sender actions. We compare the sender's payoffs in this setting with two benchmarks. In the first, in addition to committing to her actions, the sender can commit to provide the receiver with additional information. In the second, the sender can only commit to release information, but cannot commit to her actions. We illustrate our results with applications to job market signaling, communication with lying costs, and disclosure.