标题： 带有承诺的信令 显示英文标题

标题： Signaling With Commitment

摘要： 我们研究了规范的信号博弈，赋予发送者承诺能力：在了解状态之前，发送者设计一个策略，该策略将状态映射到动作上的概率分布。 我们提供了发送者可实现收益的几何特征，由与不同发送者动作相关的中间收益函数图的拓扑连接描述。 然后我们将无关收益的信息纳入博弈中，当发送者承诺（i）同时承诺信息和动作，以及（ii）仅承诺信息时，描述了可实现的收益。 通过研究这些模型变化之间的权衡，我们突出了对动作承诺的力量。 我们将我们的结果应用于仲裁程序和评级系统的設計。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We study the canonical signaling game, endowing the sender with commitment power: before learning the state, sender designs a strategy, which maps the state into a probability distribution over actions. We provide a geometric characterization of the sender's attainable payoffs, described by the topological join of the graphs of the interim payoff functions associated with different sender actions. We then incorporate payoff irrelevant messages into the game, characterizing the attainable payoffs when sender commits to (i) both messages and actions, and (ii) only messages. By studying the tradeoffs between these model variations, we highlight the power of commitment to actions. We apply our results to the design of adjudication procedures and rating systems.