标题： 具有相互依赖估值和外部性的分配问题 显示英文标题

标题： An Assignment Problem with Interdependent Valuations and Externalities

摘要： 本文中，我们采用机制设计方法来解决具有不对称信息买家的最优分配问题。此外，买方与卖方之间的分配所产生的盈余可能会受到其他分配所产生外部性的不利影响。该问题因多个因素而变得复杂。买家了解自己的估值和外部性成本，但不了解其他买家的相同信息。买家还会收到与状态相关的私人信号，因此实施问题表现出相互依赖的估值。这排除了直接应用VCG机制的可能性，为了克服这种相互依赖的问题，我们构建了一个两阶段机制。在第一阶段，我们利用企业关于状态的信号的相关性来诱导观察到的信号的真实报告。假设买方在第一阶段诚实报告，然后我们在第二阶段使用类似于VCG的机制，以诱导估值和外部性函数的真实报告。 显示英文摘要

摘要： In this paper, we take a mechanism design approach to optimal assignment problems with asymmetrically informed buyers. In addition, the surplus generated by an assignment of a buyer to a seller may be adversely affected by externalities generated by other assignments. The problem is complicated by several factors. Buyers know their own valuations and externality costs but do not know this same information for other buyers. Buyers also receive private signals correlated with the state and, consequently, the implementation problem exhibits interdependent valuations. This precludes a naive application of the VCG mechanism and to overcome this interdependency problem, we construct a two-stage mechanism. In the first stage, we exploit correlation in the firms signals about the state to induce truthful reporting of observed signals. Given that buyers are honest in stage 1, we then use a VCG-like mechanism in stage 2 that induces honest reporting of valuation and externality functions.