标题： 雇主声誉与劳动力市场：来自Glassdoor.com和Dice.com的证据 显示英文标题

标题： Employer Reputation and the Labor Market: Evidence from Glassdoor.com and Dice.com

摘要： 雇主声誉如何影响劳动力市场？ 我们使用一个结合Glassdoor.com的评论和Dice.com的工作申请数据的新数据集来研究这个问题。 劳动力市场机构如 Glassdoor.com汇集关于雇主的信息，以缓解工人在选择雇主时面临的信息问题。 原始的众包雇主评分在显示给求职者时会被四舍五入。 通过利用四舍五入阈值，我们使用回归不连续框架来确定Glassdoor评分的因果影响。 我们记录了这种评分对劳动力市场供需双方的影响。 我们发现，显示的雇主声誉会影响雇主吸引工人的能力，尤其是在显示的评分“稳定”时。 当雇主的评分高于四舍五入阈值时，雇主会发布更多新职位并重新激活更多职位。 这些影响对于私人、较小和不太知名的公司最为强烈，这表明在线声誉是其他类型声誉的替代品。 显示英文摘要

摘要： How does employer reputation affect the labor market? We investigate this question using a novel dataset combining reviews from Glassdoor.com and job applications data from Dice.com. Labor market institutions such as Glassdoor.com crowd-sources information about employers to alleviate information problems faced by workers when choosing an employer. Raw crowd-sourced employer ratings are rounded when displayed to job seekers. By exploiting the rounding threshold, we identify the causal impact of Glassdoor ratings using a regression discontinuity framework. We document the effects of such ratings on both the demand and supply sides of the labor market. We find that displayed employer reputation affects an employer's ability to attract workers, especially when the displayed rating is "sticky." Employers respond to having a rating above the rounding threshold by posting more new positions and re-activating more job postings. The effects are the strongest for private, smaller, and less established firms, suggesting that online reputation is a substitute for other types of reputation.