标题： 企业访问消费者数据的稳健调控 显示英文标题

标题： Robust Regulation of Firms' Access to Consumer Data

摘要： 本文研究了在消费者数据被用于价格歧视且监管者面临关于数据与支付意愿之间相关结构的非贝叶斯不确定性，从而关于垄断者将如何利用消费者信息分割市场存在不确定性的情况下，如何规范企业访问消费者数据的问题。我完全刻画了当监管者最大化消费者剩余时所有最坏情况下的最优政策：如果垄断者不能使用数据库来识别一小群消费者，则允许垄断者访问数据。 此外，从能实现最大最坏情况消费者剩余的政策集合中，我识别出了那些未被支配的政策；即，不存在任何替代政策，在任何情况下都不会产生更低的消费者剩余，并且有时会产生更高的消费者剩余。 显示英文摘要

摘要： In this paper I study how to regulate firms' access to consumer data when the latter is used for price discrimination and the regulator faces non-Bayesian uncertainty about the correlation structure between data and willingness to pay, and hence about the way the monopolist will use the consumers' information to segment the market. I fully characterize all policies that are worst-case optimal when the regulator maximizes consumer surplus: the regulator allows the monopolist to access data if the monopolist cannot use the database to identify a small group of consumers. Furthermore, from the set of policies that achieve the largest worst-case consumer surplus, I identify the ones that are undominated; i.e., there is no alternative policy that never yields lower consumer surplus, and sometimes strictly higher consumer surplus.