标题： 从怀疑到奉献：考验与基于学习的定价 显示英文标题

标题： From Doubt to Devotion: Trials and Learning-Based Pricing

摘要： 知情的卖家设计了一个动态机制来销售一种体验性商品。 卖家对产品匹配有部分信息，这会影响买家的私人消费体验。 我们描述了这个动态知情委托人问题的均衡机制。 知情卖家与不知情买家之间的信念差距，加上买家的学习过程，导致了为怀疑的买家提供有限产品访问权限以及如果买家被良好体验所打动则提供升级选项的机制。 根据卖家的筛选技术，这表现为免费/折扣试用或分层定价，这些在数字市场中很普遍。 与静态环境相反，在均衡情况下，拥有消费者数据可能会减少卖家的收入，因为他们利用数据微调动态设计以预测买家的学习过程。 显示英文摘要

摘要： An informed seller designs a dynamic mechanism to sell an experience good. The seller has partial information about the product match, which affects the buyer's private consumption experience. We characterize equilibrium mechanisms of this dynamic informed principal problem. The belief gap between the informed seller and the uninformed buyer, coupled with the buyer's learning, gives rise to mechanisms that provide the skeptical buyer with limited access to the product and an option to upgrade if the buyer is swayed by a good experience. Depending on the seller's screening technology, this takes the form of free/discounted trials or tiered pricing, which are prevalent in digital markets. In contrast to static environments, having consumer data can reduce sellers' revenue in equilibrium, as they fine-tune the dynamic design with their data forecasting the buyer's learning process.