标题： 机构筛选与有条件合作的可持续性 显示英文标题

标题： Institutional Screening and the Sustainability of Conditional Cooperation

摘要： 本文研究了一个偏好演化模型，在该模型中，一群代理人在不完全信息环境中被匹配进行顺序囚徒困境。 一个制度可以设计一个激励相容的筛选方案，例如一个需要入场费的特殊区域，或者购买时需要支付费用的标签，以区分条件合作者和非合作者。 我们表明，这种制度干预可以在条件合作者的合作心理收益足够强，并且特殊区域的成员资格或标签具有足够高的概率可继承时，帮助条件合作者占上风。 显示英文摘要

摘要： This paper studies a preference evolution model in which a population of agents are matched to play a sequential prisoner's dilemma in an incomplete information environment. An institution can design an incentive-compatible screening scheme, such as a special zone that requires an entry fee, or a costly label for purchase, to segregate the conditional cooperators from the non-cooperators. We show that institutional intervention of this sort can help the conditional cooperators to prevail when the psychological benefit of cooperating for them is sufficiently strong and the membership of the special zone or the label is inheritable with a sufficiently high probability.