标题： 面临事故威胁的金降落伞 显示英文标题

标题： Golden parachutes under the threat of accidents

摘要： 本文研究了一个连续时间的契约模型，该模型扩展了Sannikov提出的问题，并随后由Possamaï和Touzi进行了严格分析。 在我们的模型中，委托人雇佣了一位风险厌恶的代理人来执行一个项目。 具体来说，代理人可以执行两项不同的任务，即提高项目价值的瞬时增长率，以及降低事故发生的可能性。 为了补偿这些成本行为，委托人提供在整个合同期限内持续的支付流，合同在随机时间结束，可能导致一次性支付。 我们考察了引入事故所带来的后果，这些事故通过一个对项目价值产生负面影响的复合泊松过程进行建模。 此外，我们研究了某些经济情景是否仍然像Sannikov模型中那样具有黄金降落伞。 黄金降落伞指的是代理人停止工作后获得补偿的情况，这种补偿可能是一次性支付导致合同终止，或者是一持续支付流，从而对应于养老金。 显示英文摘要

摘要： This paper addresses a continuous-time contracting model that extends the problem introduced by Sannikov and later rigorously analysed by Possama\"{i} and Touzi. In our model, a principal hires a risk-averse agent to carry out a project. Specifically, the agent can perform two different tasks, namely to increase the instantaneous growth rate of the project's value, and to reduce the likelihood of accidents occurring. In order to compensate for these costly actions, the principal offers a continuous stream of payments throughout the entire duration of a contract, which concludes at a random time, potentially resulting in a lump-sum payment. We examine the consequences stemming from the introduction of accidents, modelled by a compound Poisson process that negatively impact the project's value. Furthermore, we investigate whether certain economic scenarii are still characterised by a golden parachute as in Sannikov's model. A golden parachute refers to a situation where the agent stops working and subsequently receives a compensation, which may be either a lump-sum payment leading to termination of the contract or a continuous stream of payments, thereby corresponding to a pension.