标题： 揭示顺序理性与前向归纳 显示英文标题

标题： Revealing Sequential Rationality and Forward Induction

摘要： 给定一个动态序数博弈，我们认为一种策略是顺序理性的，如果存在一个伯努利效用函数和一个条件概率系统，使得该策略在该条件下是一个最大化者。 我们通过新的条件B优势来表征顺序理性，从而建立了一个完备类定理。 在此基础上，我们引入了迭代条件B优势，这是一种迭代消除过程，它表征了在所研究的博弈类别中前向归纳的含义，并在满足某种一般性条件的完美信息动态序数博弈中选择了唯一的逆向归纳结果。 此外，我们证明了迭代条件B优势作为一种“前向归纳推理”的解概念，能够捕捉到： $(i)$通过二元议程中的复杂投票得到的唯一逆向归纳结果； $(ii)$来自社会环境的动态序数博弈中的远见； $(iii)$序数烧钱博弈中的唯一结果。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Given a dynamic ordinal game, we deem a strategy sequentially rational if there exist a Bernoulli utility function and a conditional probability system with respect to which the strategy is a maximizer. We establish a complete class theorem by characterizing sequential rationality via the new Conditional B-Dominance. Building on this notion, we introduce Iterative Conditional B-Dominance, which is an iterative elimination procedure that characterizes the implications of forward induction in the class of games under scrutiny and selects the unique backward induction outcome in dynamic ordinal games with perfect information satisfying a genericity condition. Additionally, we show that Iterative Conditional B-Dominance, as a `forward induction reasoning' solution concept, captures: $(i)$ the unique backward induction outcome obtained via sophisticated voting in binary agendas with sequential majority voting; $(ii)$ farsightedness in dynamic ordinal games derived from social environments; $(iii)$ a unique outcome in ordinal Money-Burning Games.