标题： 分析合取谬误作为一种事实 显示英文标题

标题： Analyizing the Conjunction Fallacy as a Fact

摘要： 自特沃斯基和卡尼曼的开创性论文以来，合取谬误一直是多个争论的主题，并成为决策认知理论的基本挑战。 在本文中，我们对这一现象采取了一种较为不常见的观点。 我们没有试图解释合取谬误的本质或原因（内涵定义），而是分析了其事实可能性的范围（外延定义）。 我们表明，根据我们所回顾的1983年至2016年文献样本中的实验，大多数关于合取谬误的研究集中在先验事实可能性的一个狭窄部分，这意味着对合取谬误的解释本质上受到所探索的可能性范围有限的偏见影响。 后者是合取谬误研究演变中的一个相当奇怪的方面，考虑到其本身的性质是基于外延考虑而产生的。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Since the seminal paper by Tversky and Kahneman, the conjunction fallacy has been the subject of multiple debates and become a fundamental challenge for cognitive theories in decision-making. In this article, we take a rather uncommon perspective on this phenomenon. Instead of trying to explain the nature or causes of the conjunction fallacy (intensional definition), we analyze its range of factual possibilities (extensional definition). We show that the majority of research on the conjunction fallacy, according to our sample of experiments reviewed which covers literature between 1983 and 2016, has focused on a narrow part of the a priori factual possibilities, implying that explanations of the conjunction fallacy are fundamentally biased by the short scope of possibilities explored. The latter is a rather curious aspect of the research evolution in the conjunction fallacy considering that the very nature of it is motivated by extensional considerations.