标题： 研究工作量证明区块链中共识和激励系统的攻击：系统文献综述 显示英文标题

标题： Examining Attacks on Consensus and Incentive Systems in Proof-of-Work Blockchains: A Systematic Literature Review

摘要： 加密货币由于相比传统金融系统具有透明性、安全性和可访问性而受到欢迎，其中2009年推出的比特币引领了市场。 比特币的安全性依赖于区块链技术——一种由共识机制和激励机制组成的去中心化账本。 共识机制，工作量证明（PoW），要求矿工解决困难的密码学难题以添加新区块，而激励机制则通过新铸造的比特币奖励他们。 然而，随着比特币的接受度增加，它面临着来自针对这些机制的攻击的日益严重的威胁，例如自私挖矿、双重支付和区块隐瞒。 这些攻击会损害安全性、效率和奖励分配。 最近的研究表明，这些攻击可以相互结合，或者与恶意策略（如网络层攻击）或非恶意策略（如诚实挖矿）结合。 这些组合会导致更复杂的攻击，提高攻击者的成功率和盈利能力。 因此，理解和评估这些攻击对于开发有效的对策并确保长期安全至关重要。 本文首先考察单独执行的攻击及其盈利能力。 然后探讨如何将这些攻击与其他恶意和非恶意策略结合，以增强其整体效果和盈利能力。 分析进一步探讨了多个竞争挖矿池之间相互部署自私挖矿和区块隐瞒等攻击对其经济回报的影响。 最后，提供了一组设计指南，概述了未来工作应关注的领域，以防止或减轻已识别的威胁。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Cryptocurrencies have gained popularity due to their transparency, security, and accessibility compared to traditional financial systems, with Bitcoin, introduced in 2009, leading the market. Bitcoin's security relies on blockchain technology - a decentralized ledger consisting of a consensus and an incentive mechanism. The consensus mechanism, Proof of Work (PoW), requires miners to solve difficult cryptographic puzzles to add new blocks, while the incentive mechanism rewards them with newly minted bitcoins. However, as Bitcoin's acceptance grows, it faces increasing threats from attacks targeting these mechanisms, such as selfish mining, double-spending, and block withholding. These attacks compromise security, efficiency, and reward distribution. Recent research shows that these attacks can be combined with each other or with either malicious strategies, such as network-layer attacks, or non-malicious strategies, like honest mining. These combinations lead to more sophisticated attacks, increasing the attacker's success rates and profitability. Therefore, understanding and evaluating these attacks is essential for developing effective countermeasures and ensuring long-term security. This paper begins by examining individual attacks executed in isolation and their profitability. It then explores how combining these attacks with each other or with other malicious and non-malicious strategies can enhance their overall effectiveness and profitability. The analysis further explores how the deployment of attacks such as selfish mining and block withholding by multiple competing mining pools against each other impacts their economic returns. Lastly, a set of design guidelines is provided, outlining areas future work should focus on to prevent or mitigate the identified threats.