标题： 网络和时间效应在社会学习中 显示英文标题

标题： Network and timing effects in social learning

摘要： 我们考虑一组代理，他们可以采取一种不可逆的代价行动，其收益取决于一个未知状态。代理从私人信号以及他们社交网络邻居的过去行动中了解该状态，这导致了推迟采取行动的动机。我们证明结果取决于网络结构：在具有线性结构的网络上，耐心的代理不会收敛到最优行动，而在规则的有向树网络上则会。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We consider a group of agents who can each take an irreversible costly action whose payoff depends on an unknown state. Agents learn about the state from private signals, as well as from past actions of their social network neighbors, which creates an incentive to postpone taking the action. We show that outcomes depend on network structure: on networks with a linear structure patient agents do not converge to the first-best action, while on regular directed tree networks they do.