标题： 保护Wi-Fi 6连接建立免受中继和伪造威胁 显示英文标题

标题： Securing Wi-Fi 6 Connection Establishment Against Relay and Spoofing Threats

摘要： 无线局域网络在连接建立（CE）阶段仍然容易受到攻击。 当前的Wi-Fi安全协议无法完全缓解中间人攻击、前导码欺骗和中继攻击等攻击。 为了加强CE阶段，本文设计了一种向后兼容的方案，在物理（PHY）层的前导码中嵌入数字签名，并设置时间限制，以有效应对这些攻击。 这种方法将MAC层签名切片，并将这些切片嵌入CE帧的前导码中，而不会增加帧的大小，使得一个或多个站点可以同时验证各自接入点（AP）的传输。 通过使站点分析PHY层头的一致模式并确定接收到的帧是否是来自预期AP的预期帧，支持并发CE，从而无需检查其MAC层头即可实现100%的准确性。 此外，我们设计并实现了快速中继攻击，以挑战我们提出的防御机制并确定其有效性。 我们扩展了现有的开源工具以支持IEEE 802.11ax，在由USRPs、商用AP和Wi-Fi设备组成的测试平台上评估所提出方案的有效性和实用性，并表明我们的中继攻击检测达到了96-100%的真正阳性率。 最后，端到端的形式化安全分析确认了所提出解决方案的安全性和正确性。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Wireless local area networks remain vulnerable to attacks initiated during the connection establishment (CE) phase. Current Wi-Fi security protocols fail to fully mitigate attacks like man-in-the-middle, preamble spoofing, and relaying. To fortify the CE phase, in this paper we design a backward-compatible scheme using a digital signature interwoven into the preambles at the physical (PHY) layer with time constraints to effectively counter those attacks. This approach slices a MAC-layer signature and embeds the slices within CE frame preambles without extending frame size, allowing one or multiple stations to concurrently verify their respective APs' transmissions. The concurrent CEs are supported by enabling the stations to analyze the consistent patterns of PHY-layer headers and identify whether the received frames are the anticipated ones from the expected APs, achieving 100% accuracy without needing to examine their MAC-layer headers. Additionally, we design and implement a fast relay attack to challenge our proposed defense and determine its effectiveness. We extend existing open-source tools to support IEEE 802.11ax to evaluate the effectiveness and practicality of our proposed scheme in a testbed consisting of USRPs, commercial APs, and Wi-Fi devices, and we show that our relay attack detection achieves 96-100% true positive rates. Finally, end-to-end formal security analyses confirm the security and correctness of the proposed solution.