标题： 基于RPKI的无位置感知的Tor网关中继选择算法 显示英文标题

标题： RPKI-Based Location-Unaware Tor Guard Relay Selection Algorithms

摘要： Tor是一个广为人知的匿名通信工具，被有各种隐私和安全需求的人使用。 先前的研究利用路由攻击来观察Tor流量并去除Tor用户的匿名性。 随后，提出了位置感知的中继选择算法以防御对Tor的此类攻击。 然而，已知位置感知的中继选择算法容易受到客户端位置信息泄露和守护节点放置攻击的影响。 我们能否设计一种新的不依赖位置的中继选择方法，同时实现防御路由攻击的类似目标？ 为此，我们在设计新的守护中继选择算法时利用了资源公钥基础设施（RPKI）。 我们通过仅结合路由起源授权（ROA）信息开发了一种轻量级折扣选择算法，并通过结合ROA和路由起源验证（ROV）信息开发了一种更安全的匹配选择算法。 我们的评估结果表明，使用我们的匹配选择算法，ROA-ROV匹配的客户端-中继对数量有所增加，在自定义Shadow模拟和基准测试中达到48.47%，且性能开销最小。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Tor is a well-known anonymous communication tool, used by people with various privacy and security needs. Prior works have exploited routing attacks to observe Tor traffic and deanonymize Tor users. Subsequently, location-aware relay selection algorithms have been proposed to defend against such attacks on Tor. However, location-aware relay selection algorithms are known to be vulnerable to information leakage on client locations and guard placement attacks. Can we design a new location-unaware approach to relay selection while achieving the similar goal of defending against routing attacks? Towards this end, we leverage the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) in designing new guard relay selection algorithms. We develop a lightweight Discount Selection algorithm by only incorporating Route Origin Authorization (ROA) information, and a more secure Matching Selection algorithm by incorporating both ROA and Route Origin Validation (ROV) information. Our evaluation results show an increase in the number of ROA-ROV matched client-relay pairs using our Matching Selection algorithm, reaching 48.47% with minimal performance overhead through custom Shadow simulations and benchmarking.