标题： 针对自私矿工的区块链订单簿机制设计 显示英文标题

标题： Mechanism Design for Blockchain Order Books against Selfish Miners

摘要： 在基于区块链的订单簿系统中，买方和卖方交易资产，而矿工负责匹配他们并将其交易包含在区块链中。 发现许多矿工表现出自私和短视的行为，优先选择费用高的交易，而忽略了可以提升社会福利的许多理想的匹配。 现有的区块链机制由于忽视了矿工的自私行为，未能解决这一问题。 据我们所知，这项工作首次进行了分析研究，以量化和理解买方和卖方的交易费用选择以及自私矿工的交易匹配策略，并证明了社会福利损失的无限大的无政府状态价格（PoA）。 为缓解这一问题，我们提出了一种可调节区块大小的机制，该机制易于实现，无需更改现有的去中心化协议，同时仍允许买方和卖方自由决定交易费用，矿工可以自私地进行匹配。 分析具有挑战性，因为纯策略纳什均衡并不总是存在，需要分析许多买方或卖方的交互混合策略分布。 此外，系统设计者甚至可能缺乏关于每个买方或卖方的出价/要价价格和交易数量的信息。 尽管如此，我们的机制实现了有良好界限的PoA，在非同质化代币（NFT）的同量交易中，它达到了1的PoA，没有社会福利损失。 我们在以太坊的一个本地实例上实现了我们的机制，以展示我们方法的可行性。 基于现实数据集的实验表明，我们的机制在类似NFT的同量交易中实现了社会最优。 与现有的订单簿基准相比，它在比特币代币的异量交易中可以将社会福利提高多达3.7倍。 它对买方和卖方的随机变化表现出鲁棒性。 显示英文摘要

摘要： In blockchain-based order book systems, buyers and sellers trade assets, while it is miners to match them and include their transactions in the blockchain. It is found that many miners behave selfishly and myopically, prioritizing transactions with high fees and ignoring many desirable matches that could enhance social welfare. Existing blockchain mechanisms fail to address this issue by overlooking miners' selfish behaviors. To our best knowledge, this work presents the first analytical study to quantify and understand buyer and seller transaction fee choices and selfish miners' transaction matching strategies, proving an infinitely large price of anarchy (PoA) for social welfare loss. To mitigate this, we propose an adjustable block size mechanism that is easy to implement without altering the existing decentralized protocols and still allows buyers and sellers to freely decide transaction fees and miners to selfishly match. The analysis is challenging, as pure strategy Nash equilibria do not always exist, requiring the analysis of many buyers' or sellers' interactive mixed-strategy distributions. Moreover, the system designer may even lack information about each buyer's or seller's bid/ask prices and trading quantities. Nevertheless, our mechanism achieves a well-bounded PoA, and under the homogeneous-quantity trading for non-fungible tokens (NFT), it attains a PoA of 1 with no social welfare loss. We implement our mechanism on a local instance of Ethereum to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach. Experiments based on the realistic dataset demonstrate that our mechanism achieves social optimum for homogeneous-quantity trading like NFT. It can enhance social welfare up to 3.7 times compared to the existing order book benchmarks for heterogeneous-quantity trading of Bitcoin tokens. It exhibits robustness against random variations in buyers and sellers.