标题： 凯恩斯选美竞赛在摩洛哥公共采购改革中的应用 显示英文标题

标题： Keynesian Beauty Contest in Morocco's Public Procurement Reform

摘要： 本文通过凯恩斯选美博弈理论的视角考察了摩洛哥公共采购市场的近期改革。改革引入了一种类似于猜平均数的游戏机制，投标者试图估算一个参考价格，这反过来影响了投标策略。我们利用这一设置来实证检验拍卖理论中的关键假设，特别是共同知识和有限理性的角色。我们的研究结果表明，在现行规则下存在潜在的操作风险，这表明转向中位数标准可能会提高稳健性并减少操作的可能性。本研究有助于增进对采购中战略互动的广泛理解，并为进一步研究如何提高公共合同分配的公平性和效率奠定了基础。 显示英文摘要

摘要： This paper examines the recent reform of Morocco's public procurement market through the lens of Keynesian beauty contest theory. The reform introduces a mechanism akin to a guessing-the-average game, where bidders attempt to estimate a reference price, which in turn impacts bidding strategies. We utilize this setup to empirically test key hypotheses within auction theory, specifically the roles of common knowledge and bounded rationality. Our findings indicate potential manipulation risks under the current rules, suggesting that a shift to a median criterion could improve robustness and reduce the likelihood of manipulation. This work contributes to the broader understanding of strategic interactions in procurement and offers a foundation for future research on improving fairness and efficiency in public contract allocation.