标题： 气候法规的成本效益取决于非气候效益 显示英文标题

标题： Cost-effectiveness of climate regulations depends on non-climate benefits

摘要： 美国长期以来一直推行旨在减少化石燃料使用的法规。 然而，尽管潜在的减排动机促使这些法规的引入和执行，这种潜力的实现并不会模糊对审慎经济政策的需要。 审视近二十年来交通运输、工业和电力部门的气候法规，我们列举了它们相关的成本效益。 我们的发现有两个方面。 首先，我们发现虽然在某些情况下气候法规带来净经济效益，但也存在合规成本显著超过碳的社会成本（SCC）的情况。 在各个行业中，根据所采用的具体SCC杠杆，多达65%的气候法规的减排成本超过了SCC。 这种超出情况在交通运输部门尤为明显，高达82%的审查法规的减排成本超过了SCC。 其次，我们发现虽然气候法规的经济效益通常超过经济成本，但这种超出主要取决于非气候效益的存在。 在各个行业中，气候效益占法规相关总体效益的33%，而公共卫生、私人和其他效益分别占18%、46%和2%。 此外，我们记录了一些情况，其中气候效益仅占法规总体效益的1.6%。 这一发现暗示了监管效率低下，并提出了另一种非气候特定的法规可能是实现这些法规相关非气候效益的更合适机制的可能性。 总体而言，我们的发现挑战了美国在过去近二十年内采取的一些（但不是全部）气候法规的经济实用性。 显示英文摘要

摘要： The United States has long pursued regulations that aim to reduce fossil fuel use. However, while potential emission reduction motivates the introduction and enforcement of these regulations, realization of this potential does not obfuscate the need for prudent economic policy. Scrutinizing nearly two decades of climate regulations in the transportation, industrial, and electric power sector, we enumerate their associated cost effectiveness. Our findings are twofold. Firstly, we find that whereas there are instances where climate regulations carry net economic benefits, there are also cases where compliance costs substantially exceed the social cost of carbon (SCC). Aggregated across sectors and subject to the precise SCC leveraged, up to 65 percent of climate regulations have abatement costs that exceed the SCC. This exceedance is particularly profound in the transportation sector where up to 82 percent of regulations reviewed have abatement costs that exceed the SCC. Secondly, we find that whereas the economic benefits of climate regulations generally exceed the economic costs, this exceedance is largely contingent on the presence of non-climate benefits. Aggregated across sectors, climate benefits account for 33 percent of overall benefits associated with a regulation, compared to 18, 46, and 2 percent for public health, private, and other benefits respectively. Furthermore, we document instances where climate benefits account for as little as 1.6 percent of overall regulatory benefits. This finding hints at a regulatory inefficiency and raises the prospect that alternative, non-climate specific regulation may be a more appropriate mechanism for realizing the non-climate benefits associated with these regulations. Collectively, our findings challenge the economic pragmatism of some (but not all) climate regulations adopted by the United States over a period of nearly two decades.