标题： 高阶进化动力学与博弈转变 显示英文标题

标题： Higher-order evolutionary dynamics with game transitions

摘要： 高阶交互在真实世界的复杂系统中普遍存在，并对系统的演化产生独特影响，这种影响无法通过成对交互来捕捉。 我们将博弈转换引入高阶囚徒困境博弈模型中，这些转换持续促进合作。 此外，在具有博弈转换的系统中，高阶交互的比例具有双重影响，既可以增强合作的出现和持久性，也可以促进入侵行为，从而在一个原本合作的系统内推动背叛行为。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Higher-order interactions are prevalent in real-world complex systems and exert unique influences on system evolution that cannot be captured by pairwise interactions. We incorporate game transitions into the higher-order prisoner's dilemma game model, where these transitions consistently promote cooperation. Moreover, in systems with game transitions, the fraction of higher-order interactions has a dual impact, either enhancing the emergence and persistence of cooperation or facilitating invasions that promote defection within an otherwise cooperative system.