标题： 高阶演化动力学与博弈转换 显示英文标题

标题： Higher-order evolutionary dynamics with game transitions

摘要： 高阶相互作用在现实世界的复杂系统中很普遍，并对系统演化产生独特影响，这些影响无法通过成对相互作用来捕捉。 我们将博弈转换引入高阶囚徒困境博弈模型，其中这些转换持续促进合作。 此外，在具有博弈转换的系统中，高阶相互作用的比例具有双重影响，要么增强合作的出现和持续，要么促进在原本合作的系统中促进背叛的入侵。 相应地，在理论分析和模拟结果中始终识别出双稳态状态，这些状态由相互背叛和相互合作或共存组成。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Higher-order interactions are prevalent in real-world complex systems and exert unique influences on system evolution that cannot be captured by pairwise interactions. We incorporate game transitions into the higher-order prisoner's dilemma game model, where these transitions consistently promote cooperation. Moreover, in systems with game transitions, the proportion of higher-order interactions has a dual impact, either enhancing the emergence and persistence of cooperation or facilitating invasions that promote defection within an otherwise cooperative system. Correspondingly, bistable states, consisting of mutual defection and either mutual cooperation or coexistence, are consistently identified in both theoretical analyses and simulation results.