标题： 企业集团，流动性冲击与创新引领的增长 显示英文标题

标题： Conglomerates, Liquidity Shocks, and Innovation-Led Growth

摘要： 我开发了一个动态模型，用于分析企业集团内部资本市场在附属公司创新潜力不同时如何应对流动性冲击。 一个两阶段框架定义了企业集团在何时应该清算低生产力企业、迫使中间类型采取短期策略，或者保护具有高潜力的企业以进行长期研发的临界规则。 将这些决策纳入内生增长模型中，我展示了最优政策如何演变：在发展的初期，强制措施可以维持流动性同时支持广泛的创新；随着经济接近前沿且短期回报下降，最优策略转向在清算和长期主义之间进行二元再分配。 我描述了两种政策失败：一是“强制陷阱”，即短期主义持续时间过长；二是“清算谬误”，即有活力的企业被过早地抛弃。 该框架为企业集团系统的动态再分配提供了微观基础，并为危机时期的重组提供了政策见解。 显示英文摘要

摘要： I develop a dynamic model of how internal capital markets in conglomerates respond to liquidity shocks when affiliated firms vary in innovation potential. A two-stage framework defines cutoff rules for when the conglomerate should liquidate low-productivity firms, coerce intermediate types into short-termist strategies, or preserve high-potential firms for long-horizon R&D. Embedding these margins into an endogenous growth model, I show how the optimal policy evolves: early in development, coercion preserves liquidity while sustaining broad innovation; as the economy nears the frontier and short-term returns decline, the optimal strategy shifts toward binary reallocation between liquidation and long-termism. I characterize two policy failures: a "coercion trap," where short-termism persists too long, and a "liquidation fallacy," where viable firms are discarded prematurely. The framework provides microfoundations for dynamic reallocation in conglomerate systems and offers policy insights for crisis-era restructuring.