标题： 通过升级的弹性：一种基于图的PACE卫星威胁响应架构 显示英文标题

标题： Resilience Through Escalation: A Graph-Based PACE Architecture for Satellite Threat Response

摘要： 卫星系统越来越多地面临来自干扰、网络攻击和电磁干扰的操作风险。 传统的冗余策略在应对动态的、多矢量威胁时往往失效。 本文介绍了一种基于PACE（主用、备用、应急、紧急）方法论的韧性设计框架，该方法最初用于军事行动中的战术通信，通过一种分层的状态转换模型将其适应于卫星系统，该模型受到威胁评分框架（如CVSS、DREAD和NASA的风险矩阵）的启发。 我们定义了一个动态韧性指数来量化系统的适应能力，并实现了三种PACE变体：静态、自适应和基于softmax的决策模型，以评估在不同干扰场景下的韧性。 所提出的方法突出了轻量级、决策感知的回退机制在提高下一代空间资产的生存能力和操作连续性方面的有效性。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Satellite systems increasingly face operational risks from jamming, cyberattacks, and electromagnetic disruptions. Traditional redundancy strategies often fail against dynamic, multi-vector threats. This paper introduces a resilience-by-design framework grounded in the PACE (Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency) methodology, originally developed for tactical communications in military operations, adapting it to satellite systems through a layered state-transition model informed by threat scoring frameworks such as CVSS, DREAD, and NASA's risk matrix. We define a dynamic resilience index to quantify system adaptability and implement three PACE variants: static, adaptive, and softmax-based decision models, to evaluate resilience under diverse disruption scenarios. The proposed approach highlights the effectiveness of lightweight, decision-aware fallback mechanisms in improving survivability and operational continuity for next-generation space assets.