标题： 核心的吸引力和凝聚力流 显示英文标题

标题： Attraction of the core and the cohesion flow

摘要： 我们采用连续时间动力系统方法来研究由减少联盟对其支付的总体不满意愿驱动的游戏状态演变。 受Grabisch和Sudhölter关于核心稳定性的研究启发，我们在预分配集合上定义了一个向量场，对于任何预分配，该向量场定义了一条凝聚力曲线，描述状态的演变。 我们证明了对于每个预分配，存在唯一的凝聚力曲线。 随后，我们表明，在平衡游戏的凝聚力流中，核心是流的唯一最小吸引子，其领域是整个预分配集合。 这些结果加深了我们对核心在可转移效用合作博弈研究中普遍性的理解。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We adopt a continuous-time dynamical system approach to study the evolution of the state of a game driven by the willingness to reduce the total dissatisfaction of the coalitions about their payment. Inspired by the work of Grabisch and Sudh\"olter about core stability, we define a vector field on the set of preimputations from which is defined, for any preimputation, a cohesion curve describing the evolution of the state. We prove that for each preimputation, there exists a unique cohesion curve. Subsequently, we show that, for the cohesion flow of a balanced game, the core is the unique minimal attractor of the flow, the realm of which is the whole preimputation set. These results improve our understanding of the ubiquity of the core in the study of cooperative games with transferable utility.