标题： 网络互惠使廉价的言论成为合作的力量 显示英文标题

标题： Network reciprocity turns cheap talk into a force for cooperation

摘要： 非约束性沟通在日常生活中很常见，并且对于促进合作至关重要，尽管它没有直接的收益后果。 然而，尽管有坚实的实证证据，其进化基础仍然不太清楚。 在这里，我们开发了一个博弈论模型，其中个体可以在进行捐赠博弈之前发出合作意图的信号。 策略在如何响应这些信号方面有所不同，从无条件到有条件类型，后者需要付出认知成本进行思考。 通过进化分析，我们表明仅靠非约束性沟通无法在混合良好、匿名的人群中维持合作，这与实证观察一致。 相反，结构化的人群支持合作的出现，有条件的合作行为者作为催化剂，通过依赖情境的循环主导模式保护无条件的合作行为者。 这些发现提供了一种进化解释，说明非约束性沟通如何促进合作，并为在不同社会环境中探索其影响提供了建模框架。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Non-binding communication is common in daily life and crucial for fostering cooperation, even though it has no direct payoff consequences. However, despite robust empirical evidence, its evolutionary basis remains poorly understood. Here, we develop a game-theoretic model in which individuals can signal an intention to cooperate before playing a Donation game. Strategies differ in how they respond to these signals, ranging from unconditional to conditional types, with the latter incurring a cognitive cost for deliberation. Through evolutionary analysis, we show that non-binding communication alone cannot sustain cooperation in well-mixed, anonymous populations, consistent with empirical observations. In contrast, structured populations support the emergence of cooperation, with conditional cooperators acting as catalysts that protect unconditional cooperators through context-dependent patterns of cyclic dominance. These findings offer an evolutionary explanation for how non-binding communication promotes cooperation and provide a modelling framework for exploring its effects in diverse social settings.