标题： 幸运出局还是支付出局？ 当垄断与公共选项竞争时 显示英文标题

标题： Luck Out or Outpay? When a Monopoly Competes with a Public Option

摘要： 本文研究了以利润最大化为目标的垄断者如何与一个免费但容量受限的公共选项竞争。 垄断者战略性地将其供应量限制在标准垄断水平以上，从而加剧公共选项的拥挤状况，并提高消费者对保证准入的支付意愿。 扩大公共选项的容量总是会降低生产者福利，而且出人意料的是，也可能降低消费者福利。 相比之下，在仅由一个容量受限的公共选项服务的市场中引入垄断者无疑会改善消费者福利。 这些发现对混合公共私营市场具有重要意义，例如住房、教育和医疗保健。 显示英文摘要

摘要： This paper examines how a profit-maximizing monopolist competes against a free but capacity-constrained public option. The monopolist strategically restricts its supply beyond standard monopoly levels, thereby intensifying congestion at the public option and increasing consumers' willingness-to-pay for guaranteed access. Expanding the capacity of the public option always reduces producer welfare and, counterintuitively, may also reduce consumer welfare. In contrast, introducing a monopolist to a market served only by a capacity-constrained public option unambiguously improves consumer welfare. These findings have implications for mixed public-private markets, such as housing, education, and healthcare.