标题： 共享网络中的权力与事前联盟 显示英文标题

标题： Power in Sharing Networks with a priori Unions

摘要： 我们引入并分析了一类新型的权力指数，专门用于技术市场中的共享网络，其中企业在不同工业部门内部竞争，但不跨部门竞争。 在这些情况下，企业间的合作结构来源于正式的技术许可协议。 所提出的指数定义在具有先验联盟的图上，并结合了两种关键的中心性度量——基于度数的中心性和重新缩放的特征向量中心性，这些度量由反映部门动态的正市场系数进行调制。 我们首先探讨这些指数的单调性特性，强调它们对网络结构局部变化的响应能力。 有趣的是，当跨部门的技术溢出效应较小时，主要经济参与者表现出结构稳定性。 在此基础上，我们通过将这些指数表征为一类定义在这些图上的连贯且经济可解释的可转移效用（TU）博弈的Shapley值，提供了理论基础。 然而，对于一大类网络结构，这些TU博弈的核心通常是空的，表明技术共享安排存在内在不稳定性。 最后，我们为这一类指数提供了公理化基础，证明了所提出公理的独立性。 这种公理化自然扩展到交换网络，即使阶段传播系数不是正的也是如此。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We introduce and analyze a novel family of power indices tailored for sharing networks in technological markets, where firms operate competitively within, but not across, distinct industrial sectors. In these settings, inter-firm collaboration structures emerge from formal technology licensing agreements. The proposed indices are defined over graphs with a priori unions and combine two key centrality measures - degree-based and rescaled eigenvector centrality - modulated by positive market coefficients that reflect sectoral dynamics. We first explore the monotonicity properties of these indices, highlighting their responsiveness to local changes in network structure. Interestingly, major economic actors exhibit structural stability when inter-sectoral technological spillovers are minimal. Building on these findings, we provide theoretical underpinnings by characterizing the indices as the Shapley values of a family of coherent and economically interpretable transferable utility (TU) games defined over such graphs. However, for a broad class of network structures, the core of these TU games is often empty, signaling inherent instability in technological sharing arrangements. Finally, we offer an axiomatic foundation for this family of indices, proving independence of the proposed axioms. This axiomatization extends naturally to exchange networks, even when stage-propagation coefficients are not positive.