标题： 游说环境的探索：来自意见动力学模型的见解 显示英文标题

标题： Navigating the Lobbying Landscape: Insights from Opinion Dynamics Models

摘要： 虽然游说已被证明对公众意见和政策制定有重要影响，但现有的意见形成模型并未特别包含其影响。 在本工作中，我们引入了一个新的意见动态模型，其中游说者可以实施复杂策略，并由有限的预算所表征。 个体通过类似于贝叶斯学习的学习过程更新其意见，但受到认知偏差的影响，例如反应不足和确认偏误。 我们通过数值研究该模型，并展示了存在和不存在游说者时丰富的动态特性。 在游说存在的条件下，我们观察到两种状态：一种是游说者可以完全影响代理网络的状态，另一种是同伴效应产生极化。 当存在对称游说者时，游说者影响状态以长期意见振荡为特征，而在两种状态之间的过渡区域，当游说影响足够长时，我们观察到向乐观模型的收敛。 这些丰富的动态为研究实际游说策略以在实践中验证模型提供了途径。 显示英文摘要

摘要： While lobbying has been demonstrated to have an important effect on public opinion and policy making, existing models of opinion formation do not specifically include its effect. In this work we introduce a new model of opinion dynamics where lobbyists can implement complex strategies and are characterised by a finite budget. Individuals update their opinions through a learning process resembling Bayesian learning, but influenced by cognitive biases such as under-reaction and confirmation bias. We study the model numerically and demonstrate rich dynamics both with and without lobbyists. In the presence of lobbying, we observe two regimes: one in which lobbyists can have full influence on the agent network, and another where the peer-effect generates polarisation. When symmetric lobbyists are present, the lobbyist influence regime is characterised by long opinion oscillations, while in the transition area between the two regimes we observe convergence to the optimistic model when the lobbying influence is long enough. These rich dynamics pave the way for studying real lobbying strategies to validate the model in practice.