标题： 磁电离子硬件安全原语：在材料层面嵌入数据保护 显示英文标题

标题： Magneto-Ionic Hardware Security Primitives: Embedding Data Protection at the Material Level

摘要： 大数据革命提高了对强大、节能的安全硬件的需求，这些硬件能够抵御日益复杂的网络威胁。 传统的加密方案依赖于复杂的算法，资源消耗大且仍然存在漏洞。 为了保护敏感信息，社会需要创新的防黑客和防伪技术，这些技术利用新材料和设计。 在此，我们提出了一种基于预定义初始顺磁性FeCoN点内完全选择性电压控制N3-离子迁移的磁电策略，用于硬件级安全。 该过程生成可调厚度的铁磁亚层，导致确定性（单域或涡旋）或概率状态（共存磁配置和电压可调概率），每种状态表现出随机取向和手性，从而为磁指纹提供了一个丰富的平台。 这种方法实现了自保护原语，包括真随机数生成器、物理不可克隆函数和内存中概率推理。 由此产生的可重构架构结合了抗篡改性、低能耗和可扩展性，标志着向基于新兴磁现象的下一代硬件安全的重要飞跃。 显示英文摘要

摘要： The Big Data revolution has heightened the demand for robust, energy-efficient security hardware capable of withstanding increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. Conventional encryption schemes, reliant on complex algorithms, are resource-intensive and remain vulnerable. To fortify sensitive information, society needs innovative anti-hacking and anti-counterfeiting technologies that exploit new materials and designs. Here, we present a magneto-ionic strategy for hardware-level security based on fully selective voltage-controlled N3- ion migration within pre-defined, initially paramagnetic FeCoN dots. This process generates ferromagnetic sublayers of tuneable thickness, resulting in either deterministic (single-domain or vortex) or probabilistic states (with coexisting magnetic configurations and voltage-adjustable probabilities), each exhibiting stochastic orientation and chirality, thereby providing a rich platform for magnetic fingerprinting. This approach enables self-protected primitives, including true random number generators, physical unclonable functions, and in-memory probabilistic inference. The resulting reconfigurable architecture combines tamper resistance, low energy consumption, and scalability, marking a significant leap toward next-generation hardware security rooted in emergent magnetic phenomena.