标题： 中央银行数字货币：需求冲击与最优货币政策 显示英文标题

标题： Central Bank Digital Currency: Demand Shocks and Optimal Monetary Policy

摘要： 我们研究了中央银行数字货币（CBDC）在新凯恩斯框架下对家庭偏好冲击传导以及福利的影响，其中CBDC与银行存款竞争家庭资源，而银行具有市场力量。 我们表明，CBDC收益的增加具有温和的扩张效应，削弱银行的市场力量并显著减少存款利差。 随着家庭节省流动性资产持有，他们减少了CBDC和存款余额。 然而，银行去中介的程度较低，因为存款流出仍然适中。 随后，我们研究了CBDC利率设定的福利影响，发现与无利息的CBDC相比，使用标准系数的CBDC利率泰勒规则带来的收益是适度的，但当系数优化时，收益变得相当大。 当CBDC提供更高的收益时，福利收益更高。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We study the implications of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) for the transmission of household preference shocks and for welfare in a New Keynesian framework where the CBDC competes with bank deposits for household resources and banks have market power. We show that an increase in the benefit of CBDC has a mildly expansionary effect, weakening bank market power and significantly reducing the deposit spread. As households economize on liquid asset holdings, they reduce both CBDC and deposit balances. However, the degree of bank disintermediation is low, as deposit outflows remain modest. We then examine the welfare implications of CBDC rate setting and find that, compared to a non-interest-bearing CBDC, the gains with standard coefficients for a CBDC interest rate Taylor rule are modest, but they become considerable when the coefficients are optimized. Welfare gains are higher when the CBDC provides a higher benefit.