标题： 时间偏好异质性和柠檬市场下的保护性耕作技术采用中的策略演化：来自进化动力学的见解 显示英文标题

标题： Strategy Evolution in the Adoption of Conservation Tillage Technology under Time Preference Heterogeneity and Lemon Market: Insights from Evolutionary Dynamics

摘要： 推广保护性耕作技术（CTT）对于缓解全球土壤退化至关重要，但其实际采用率仍远低于预期目标。 现有研究主要集中在静态因素分析上，未能充分捕捉农民战略互动的动态演化机制以及农业市场信息不对称的影响。 本研究构建了一个整合异质时间偏好和柠檬市场效应的演化博弈模型，以揭示在有限理性下农民群体内部技术采用的动态均衡。 关键发现表明，具有高时间偏好的农民由于对长期利益的过度贴现，显著阻碍了CTT的采用。 此外，柠檬市场效应决定了系统的均衡状态：1）当柠檬市场收益（$P$）超过柠檬市场损失（$Q$）（$P > Q$）时，会出现稳定的三方共存采用策略；2）当$P < Q$时，系统会不可预测地演进，表现出由异宿环循环特征的动力学；3）在临界阈值$P = Q$时，系统转变为保守的哈密顿系统，产生稳定的周期振荡解。 基于这些见解，提出了政策建议：实施生态认证计划以缓解信息不对称，提供补贴和保险以降低采用风险，并利用环境税来内部化传统耕作的负面外部性。 本研究不仅为绿色农业技术的扩散提供了一个动态分析范式，还为发展中国家设计可持续农业政策提供了理论基础。 显示英文摘要

摘要： The promotion of Conservation Tillage Technology (CTT) is critical for mitigating global soil degradation, yet their actual adoption rates remain substantially lower than anticipated targets. Existing research predominantly focuses on static factor analyses, failing to adequately capture the dynamic evolutionary mechanisms of farmer strategic interactions and the impacts of information asymmetries in agricultural markets. This study constructs an evolutionary game model integrating heterogeneous time preferences and lemon market effects to reveal the dynamic equilibrium of technology adoption within farmer groups operating under bounded rationality. Key findings indicate that farmers with high time preferences significantly impede CTT adoption due to the excessive discounting of long-term benefits. Furthermore, the lemon market effect dictates the system's equilibrium states: 1) When the lemon market benefit ($P$) exceeds the lemon market loss ($Q$) ($P > Q$), stable tripartite coexistence of adoption strategies emerges; 2) When $P < Q$, the system evolves unpredictably, exhibiting dynamics characterized by heteroclinic cycles; 3) At the critical threshold $P = Q$, the system transforms into a conservative Hamiltonian system, yielding stable periodic oscillation solutions. Based on these insights, policy recommendations are proposed: implementing ecological certification schemes to mitigate information asymmetry, offering subsidies and insurance to reduce adoption risks, and utilizing environmental taxes to internalize the negative externalities associated with conventional tillage. This research not only provides a dynamic analytical paradigm for the diffusion of green agricultural technologies but also furnishes a theoretical foundation for designing sustainable agricultural policies in developing countries.