标题： 基于负载改变攻击下的负荷频率控制的网络物理协同仿真 显示英文标题

标题： Cyber-Physical Co-Simulation of Load Frequency Control under Load-Altering Attacks

摘要： 将信息和通信技术（ICT）设备集成到电力网络中带来了许多好处。 然而，这也使电网面临新的潜在网络威胁。 许多控制和保护机制，如负载频率控制（LFC），在负载波动期间负责维持额定频率，以及低频负载切除（UFLS）在紧急情况下断开部分负载，都依赖于通过通信网络进行的信息交换。 最近出现的负载改变攻击（LAAs）利用高功率设备的僵尸网络引入负载波动。 在它们的动态形式（DLAAs）中，它们根据实时电网频率测量值来操纵负载，以提高效率，这对电网稳定性构成了显著威胁。 认识到通信网络在电力网络网络安全研究中的重要性，本文提出了一种开源的协同仿真环境，该环境将电力网络与相应的通信网络进行建模，并实现了电网保护机制。 这种设置允许对攻击在具体的LFC和UFLS场景中进行全面分析。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Integrating Information and Communications Technology (ICT) devices into the power grid brings many benefits. However, it also exposes the grid to new potential cyber threats. Many control and protection mechanisms, such as Load Frequency Control (LFC), responsible for maintaining nominal frequency during load fluctuations and Under Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS) disconnecting portion of the load during an emergency, are dependent on information exchange through the communication network. The recently emerging Load Altering Attacks (LAAs) utilize a botnet of high-wattage devices to introduce load fluctuation. In their dynamic form (DLAAs), they manipulate the load in response to live grid frequency measurements for increased efficiency, posing a notable threat to grid stability. Recognizing the importance of communication networks in power grid cyber security research, this paper presents an open-source co-simulation environment that models the power grid with the corresponding communication network, implementing grid protective mechanisms. This setup allows the comprehensive analysis of the attacks in concrete LFC and UFLS scenarios.