标题： 量子密钥分发实现的网络安全 显示英文标题

标题： Cybersecurity of Quantum Key Distribution Implementations

摘要： 量子密钥分发（QKD）的实际实现通常偏离理论协议，即使底层（理想）协议已被证明是安全的，这些实现仍可能受到各种攻击。 我们提出了新的分析工具和方法学，用于量子网络安全，将经典网络安全中的漏洞、攻击面和利用概念应用于QKD实现攻击。 我们提出了三个额外的概念，这些概念来源于经典网络安全与量子网络安全之间的联系：“量子模糊测试”，这是针对QKD实现的黑盒漏洞研究的第一个工具；“反向空间攻击”，这是一种使用不完美接收器的攻击面的通用利用方法；以及“量子侧信道攻击”的具体量子力学定义，有意义地区分它们与其他类型的攻击。 使用我们的工具，我们分析了多个现有的QKD攻击，并表明即使对设备实现了解很少，“明亮照明”攻击也有可能被完全构建。 这项工作开始弥合当前对QKD实现实验攻击的分析方法与经典网络安全领域数十年的研究之间的差距，提高了QKD产品的实际安全性，并增强了它们在现实系统中的实用性。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Practical implementations of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) often deviate from the theoretical protocols, exposing the implementations to various attacks even when the underlying (ideal) protocol is proven secure. We present new analysis tools and methodologies for quantum cybersecurity, adapting the concepts of vulnerabilities, attack surfaces, and exploits from classical cybersecurity to QKD implementation attacks. We present three additional concepts, derived from the connection between classical and quantum cybersecurity: "Quantum Fuzzing", which is the first tool for black-box vulnerability research on QKD implementations; "Reversed-Space Attacks", which are a generic exploit method using the attack surface of imperfect receivers; and a concrete quantum-mechanical definition of "Quantum Side-Channel Attacks", meaningfully distinguishing them from other types of attacks. Using our tools, we analyze multiple existing QKD attacks and show that the "Bright Illumination" attack could have been fully constructed even with minimal knowledge of the device implementation. This work begins to bridge the gap between current analysis methods for experimental attacks on QKD implementations and the decades-long research in the field of classical cybersecurity, improving the practical security of QKD products and enhancing their usefulness in real-world systems.