标题： 两阶段非对称图洛锦标赛与成本转移器和内生继续决策 显示英文标题

标题： Two-Stage Asymmetric Tullock Contests with Cost Shifters and Endogenous Continuation Decision

摘要： 本文介绍了一个竞赛理论的简化三铁模型，作为一个顺序的两阶段博弈。 在第一阶段（游泳后），参与者决定是否继续或退出比赛，从而产生内生的参与决策。 在第二阶段（骑行-跑步），竞争被表示为一个Tullock竞赛，其中游泳跟随作为二次努力成本的乘法调整因子。 在两人情况下推导出了显式均衡策略，并在非对称的n人情况下展示了存在性、唯一性和比较静态分析。 继续决策产生了与运动员相关的游泳跟随强度临界规则，并引发了具有内生参与集合的子博弈完美均衡（SPE）。 分析将游泳跟随的好处、曝光度和群体大小与异质的有效成本参数和均衡努力联系起来。 显示英文摘要

摘要： This paper introduces a contest-theoretic simplified model of triathlon as a sequential two-stage game. In Stage 1 (post-swim), participants decide whether to continue or withdraw from the contest, thereby generating an endogenous participation decision. In Stage 2 (bike-run), competition is represented as a Tullock contest in which swim drafting acts as a multiplicative shifter of quadratic effort costs. Closed-form equilibrium strategies are derived in the two-player case, and existence, uniqueness, and comparative statics are shown in the asymmetric n-player case. The continuation decision yields athlete-specific cutoff rules in swim drafting intensity and induces subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) with endogenous participation sets. The analysis relates swim drafting benefits, exposure, and group size to heterogeneous effective cost parameters and equilibrium efforts.