标题： 看不见的握手：自适应市场代理之间的默示共谋 显示英文标题

标题： The Invisible Handshake: Tacit Collusion between Adaptive Market Agents

摘要： 我们研究适应性交易代理在具有内生价格形成的随机市场中隐性共谋的出现。 通过市场做市商和市场参与者之间的双人重复博弈，我们描述了可行的和共谋的战略配置，这些配置将价格提高到竞争水平以上。 我们表明，当代理遵循简单的学习算法（例如梯度上升）来最大化自己的财富时，即使在流动性很高的市场且交易规模较小的情况下，产生的动态也会收敛到共谋战略配置。 通过突出简单学习策略如何自然导致隐性共谋，我们的结果为人工智能驱动市场的动态提供了新的见解。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We study the emergence of tacit collusion between adaptive trading agents in a stochastic market with endogenous price formation. Using a two-player repeated game between a market maker and a market taker, we characterize feasible and collusive strategy profiles that raise prices beyond competitive levels. We show that, when agents follow simple learning algorithms (e.g., gradient ascent) to maximize their own wealth, the resulting dynamics converge to collusive strategy profiles, even in highly liquid markets with small trade sizes. By highlighting how simple learning strategies naturally lead to tacit collusion, our results offer new insights into the dynamics of AI-driven markets.