标题： 当代量子理论的解释：一些本体论特征 显示英文标题

标题： Explanations from contemporary quantum theories: some ontological characteristics

摘要： 我们首先回顾自现代科学兴起以来，不同尝试理解物质世界的歷史观点，特别关注笛卡尔原始性质在解释概念化中的作用。 此外，第一章论证了虽然解释性叙述本质上是认识论的构造，但它们需要通过解释者和被解释者对概念及由其组成的更高结构作为直接指称的承诺来获得一般的形而上学支持。 两种关于理论构建的方法论视角，爱因斯坦将理论分为原理性和构造性理论，随后沿着它们的形而上学和解释潜力进行阐述，并作为研究工具来接近量子理论重建的具体案例研究实例。 然后提出了一种为科学实在论辩护的特定策略（“简单的先验策略”），并将其与当代量子理论领域中现象（EPR关联和“量子隐形传态”）对其提出的挑战联系起来。 第一章最后对一般的解释模型及其在上述原理-构造二分法中的位置进行了概述。 最后，主张一种包含扩展的类似物质实体以及进一步原始概念、普遍的时间演化定律的解释模型。 因此，为了对关于科学解释目标的怀疑论挑战做出全面的实在论回应，我们建议即使常识概念框架也应将扩展的物质结构替换为“广义事物”，这些事物在变化中可重新识别为不变量，作为实在论本体论的基本单位。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We begin by surveying the historical positions in different attempts to understand the material world since the rise of modern science, with specific focus on the role of Cartesian primary qualities in explanatory conceptualisation. Moreover the opening chapter argues that although explanatory narratives are essentially epistemological constructions, they require a general metaphysical backing through the explainer's and explainee's commitments to take the concepts and higher structures composed of them as directly referential. Two methodological perspectives on theory construction, Einstein's division into principle and constructive theories, are then delineated along the lines of their metaphysical and explanatory potential, and presented as the research instrument with which to approach the specific-case-study instances of quantum theory reconstruction. A specific strategy of arguing for scientific realism ('the simple transcendental strategy') is then presented and connected to the challenges that the phenomena (EPR correlations and 'teleportation') from the domain of contemporary quantum theory pose for it. The opening chapter concludes with a survey of the general models of explanation and their position with respect to the principle-constructive dichotomy introduced above. Finally, an explanatory model containing extended material-like entities along with further primitives, universal laws of temporal evolution, is argued for. Consequently, in the interest of a wholesome realistic response to the sceptical challenge about the explanatory aims of science, we recommend that even the common sense conceptual framework replaces the extended material structure with 'generalised things' as re-identifiable invariants through change as the fundamental unit of the realist ontology.