标题： 进化多参与者游戏中多种策略的丰富性 显示英文标题

标题： Strategy abundance in evolutionary many-player games with multiple strategies

摘要： 进化博弈论是一种抽象且简单但非常强大的方法，用于建模进化动态。 即使复杂的生物现象有时也可以抽象为简单的两人博弈。 但通常，多方之间的相互作用决定了进化成功。 在这种情况下，我们必须考虑多个参与者之间的相互作用，这些相互作用本质上比通常的两人博弈更复杂，但仍可能产生简单的结果。 在本文中，我们推导了突变-选择平衡下多参与者多策略系统的组成。 这导致了一个简单的表达式，可以通过使用凝聚理论的递归得到。 这种方法可以修改以适应各种情境，例如。 找出多态性中有限数量等位基因的平衡频率，或文化背景下社会困境中不同策略的平衡频率。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Evolutionary game theory is an abstract and simple, but very powerful way to model evolutionary dynamics. Even complex biological phenomena can sometimes be abstracted to simple two-player games. But often, the interaction between several parties determines evolutionary success. Rather than pair-wise interactions, in this case we must take into account the interactions between many players, which are inherently more complicated than the usual two-player games, but can still yield simple results. In this manuscript we derive the composition of a many-player multiple strategy system in the mutation-selection equilibrium. This results in a simple expression which can be obtained by recursions using coalescence theory. This approach can be modified to suit a variety of contexts, e.g. to find the equilibrium frequencies of a finite number of alleles in a polymorphism or that of different strategies in a social dilemma in a cultural context.