标题： 空间异质环境中的一种罕见突变模型：鹰鸽博弈 显示英文标题

标题： A rare mutation model in a spatial heterogeneous environment: the Hawk and Dove game

摘要： 我们提出了一种进化博弈论中的随机模型，其中个体（或亚种群）可以随机（但很少）发生突变，从而改变其策略并探索外部环境。这种环境通过修改策略之间相互作用产生的收益来影响选择压力。我们推导出一个福克-普朗克积分微分方程，并为鹰鸽博弈提供了蒙特卡洛模拟。特别是我们表明，在某些情况下，考虑外部环境有利于低适应性策略的持续存在。 显示英文摘要

摘要： We propose a stochastic model in evolutionary game theory where individuals (or subpopulations) can mutate changing their strategies randomly (but rarely) and explore the external environment. This environment affects the selective pressure by modifying the payoff arising from the interactions between strategies. We derive a Fokker-Plank integro-differential equation and provide Monte-Carlo simulations for the Hawks vs Doves game. In particular we show that, in some cases, taking into account the external environment favors the persistence of the low-fitness strategy.