标题： 没有微观物理因果关系，任何事物都不能在任何地方开始存在 显示英文标题

标题： Without microphysical causation, just anything cannot begin to exist just anywhere

摘要： 根据因果原理，任何开始存在的事物都有一个原因。 反过来，各种作者——包括托马斯·霍布斯、乔纳森·爱德华兹和亚瑟·普里奥尔——都捍卫这样一个观点：如果因果原理是错误的，那么就无法很好地解释为什么实体不会在任意时间、任意空间位置、以任意数量或以任意种类开始。 我称这个为霍布斯-爱德华兹-普里奥尔原则（HEPP）。 然而，根据哲学物理学家和自然主义形而上学家之间流行的一种观点——新罗素主义——因果关系在基础物理学中是不存在的。 我认为基于HEPP的反对意见对新罗素主义者没有辩证力量。 虽然新罗素主义者认为基础物理学中没有因果关系，但他们也有充分的理由拒绝HEPP。 显示英文摘要

摘要： According to the Causal Principle, anything that begins to exist has a cause. In turn, various authors -- including Thomas Hobbes, Jonathan Edwards, and Arthur Prior -- have defended the thesis that, had the Causal Principle been false, there would be no good explanation for why entities do not begin at arbitrary times, in arbitrary spatial locations, in arbitrary number, or of arbitrary kind. I call this the Hobbes-Edwards-Prior Principle (HEPP). However, according to a view popular among both philosophers of physics and naturalistic metaphysicians -- Neo-Russellianism -- causation is absent from fundamental physics. I argue that objections based on the HEPP should have no dialectical force for Neo-Russellians. While Neo-Russellians maintain that there is no causation in fundamental physics, they also have good reason to reject the HEPP.