标题： 去中心化交易所的套利 显示英文标题

标题： Arbitrage on Decentralized Exchanges

摘要： 去中心化交易所（DEXs）是交易加密货币的替代场所，与中心化交易所（CEXs）相比，其受欢迎程度越来越高。 当一种加密货币在DEX中的汇率与在CEX中的汇率不同时，就会出现套利机会。 套利者可以在这两个交易所进行交易以获利。 在DEX上交易会产生气体费用，这决定了交易执行的优先级。 我们研究了两个套利者之间的气体费用竞争博弈，他们旨在最大化从交易中获得的预期利润。 我们推导出了唯一的对称混合纳什均衡，并发现（i）当套利机会和流动性较小时，套利者可能选择不交易；（ii）套利者选择较高气体费用的概率较低；（iii）当套利机会变大且流动性提高时，套利者会支付更高的气体费用并进行更多交易；（iv）套利者的预期利润可能随着套利机会和流动性的增加而增加。 上述发现与我们的实证研究一致。 显示英文摘要

摘要： Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) are alternative venues to centralized exchanges (CEXs) for trading cryptocurrencies and have become increasingly popular. An arbitrage opportunity arises when the exchange rate of two cryptocurrencies in a DEX differs from that in a CEX. Arbitrageurs can then trade on the DEX and CEX to make a profit. Trading on the DEX incurs a gas fee, which determines the priority of the trade being executed. We study a gas-fee competition game between two arbitrageurs who maximize their expected profit from trading. We derive the unique symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium and find that (i) the arbitrageurs may choose not to trade when the arbitrage opportunity and liquidity is small; (ii) the probability of the arbitrageurs choosing a higher gas fee is lower; (iii) the arbitrageurs pay a higher gas fee and trade more when the arbitrage opportunity becomes larger and when liquidity becomes higher; (iv) the arbitrageurs' expected profit could increase with arbitrage opportunity and liquidity. The above findings are consistent with our empirical study.