Title: Democratic Policy Decisions with Decentralized Promises Contingent on Vote Outcome Show Chinese title

Title: 基于投票结果的去中心化承诺的民主政策决策

Abstract: We study how decentralized utility transfer promises affect collective decision-making by voting. Committee members with varying levels of support and opposition for an efficient reform can make enforceable promises before voting. An equilibrium requires stability and minimal promises. Equilibrium promises exist and are indeterminate, but do share several key characteristics. Equilibria require transfer promises from high to low intensity members and result in enacting the reform. When reform supporters lack sufficient voting power, promises must reach across the aisle. Even if the coalition of reform supporters is decisive, promises must preclude the least enthusiastic supporters of the reform from being enticed to overturn the decision. In that case, equilibrium promises do not need to reach across the aisle. We also discuss a finite sequence of promises that achieve an equilibrium. Show Chinese abstract

Abstract: 我们研究去中心化的效用转移承诺如何影响通过投票进行的集体决策。 在投票前，支持和反对一项有效改革的委员会成员可以做出具有约束力的承诺。 均衡需要稳定性和最少的承诺。 均衡承诺存在且不确定，但有几个关键特征是共通的。 均衡需要从高强度成员向低强度成员做出转移承诺，并导致实施改革。 当改革支持者缺乏足够的投票权时，承诺必须跨党派达成。 即使改革支持者的联盟具有决定性，承诺必须防止最不热情的改革支持者被引诱来推翻决定。 在这种情况下，均衡承诺不需要跨党派达成。 我们还讨论了一个实现均衡的有限承诺序列。