Title: Democratic Policy Decisions with Decentralized Promises Contingent on Vote Outcome Show Chinese title

Title: 基于投票结果的去中心化承诺的民主政策决策

Abstract: We examine how decentralized and simultaneous utility transfer promises affect collective decision-making by voting. Committee members with varying levels of support and opposition to an efficient reform can make enforceable promises before voting. An equilibrium requires stability and minimal total promises. Equilibria exist and are indeterminate, but do share several key characteristics. Equilibria result in enacting the reform and necessitate transfer promises from high to low-intensity members. When reform supporters lack sufficient voting power, promises must reach across the aisle. When reform supporters have enough voting power to enact the reform, promises must preclude reform opponents to entice the least enthusiastic reform supporters to become reform opponents. In that case, equilibrium promises do not need to reach across the aisle unless the weakest reform supporters have homogeneous intensities. We also discuss a finite sequence of promises that achieve an equilibrium that minimizes the ranges of intensities. Show Chinese abstract

Abstract: 我们研究去中心化和同时的效用转移承诺如何通过投票影响集体决策。 在投票前，支持或反对一项有效改革的不同程度的委员会成员可以做出具有约束力的承诺。 均衡需要稳定性和最小的总承诺。 均衡存在且是不确定的，但有几个关键特征是共通的。 均衡导致实施改革，并要求高强度成员向低强度成员做出转移承诺。 当改革支持者缺乏足够的投票权时，承诺必须跨党派进行。 当改革支持者有足够的投票权来实施改革时，承诺必须阻止改革反对者，以说服最不积极的改革支持者成为改革反对者。 在这种情况下，均衡承诺不需要跨党派进行，除非最弱的改革支持者具有同质的强度。 我们还讨论了一个有限的承诺序列，该序列可以实现一个使强度范围最小化的均衡。