Title: Unlocking Democratic Efficiency: How Coordinated Outcome-Contingent Promises Shape Decisions Show Chinese title

Title: 解锁民主效率：协调的结果依赖承诺如何影响决策

Abstract: We consider a committee voting on whether to adopt a reform under a quota rule, where members differ in how much they value the reform some supporting it, others opposing it. We examine how members can influence each other's votes through coordinated non-negative transfer promises, made prior to voting and contingent on the vote outcome. In equilibrium, these transfers are structured to prevent any coalition from profitably deviating in a coordinated way, while minimizing total transfers. We provide a complete characterization of these `strong' equilibria and show that they exist, are indeterminate, efficient, and involve transfers from high- to low-utility members. Such transfers prevent opponents from swaying less enthusiastic supporters and may be directed not only to opponents but also to lukewarm supporters. Show Chinese abstract

Abstract: 我们考虑一个委员会在配额规则下投票决定是否采用改革，成员们对改革的价值看法不同，一些人支持，一些人反对。 我们研究成员如何通过协调的非负转移承诺影响彼此的投票，这些承诺在投票前作出，并取决于投票结果。 在均衡状态下，这些转移被设计成防止任何联盟以协调的方式有利地偏离，同时最小化总转移量。 我们提供了这些“强”均衡的完整描述，并证明它们存在、不确定、有效，并涉及从高收益成员到低收益成员的转移。 这些转移可以防止反对者影响热情不高的支持者，并且不仅可能指向反对者，也可能指向态度模棱两可的支持者。