Title: Democratic Policy Decisions with Decentralized Promises Contingent on Vote Outcome Show Chinese title

Title: 基于投票结果的去中心化承诺的民主政策决策

Abstract: We study pre-vote interactions in a committee that enacts a welfare-improving reform through voting in the presence of heterogeneous utilities. Committee members use decentralized irrevocable promises of non-negative transfers contingent on the vote outcome to influence the voting behaviour of other committee members. Equilibrium transfers require that no coalition can deviate in a self-enforcing manner that benefits all its members ({\it Strong Nash}) and minimize total transfers. We show that equilibria exist, are indeterminate, efficient, and involve transfers from high- to low-utility members. Equilibrium transfers prevent reform opponents from persuading less enthusiastic reform supporters to vote against the reform. Transfer recipients can be reform supporters. Show Chinese abstract

Abstract: 我们研究在存在异质效用的情况下，委员会通过投票实施改善福利的改革前的互动。 委员会成员使用去中心化的不可撤销承诺，即在投票结果基础上的非负转移，以影响其他委员会成员的投票行为。 均衡转移要求没有任何联盟能够以自我执行的方式偏离并使所有成员受益（{\it 强纳什}），并且最小化总转移。 我们证明均衡存在、不确定、有效，并且涉及从高效益成员到低效益成员的转移。 均衡转移防止改革反对者说服不太热衷的改革支持者投票反对改革。 转移接受者可以是改革支持者。