Title: Democratic Policy Decisions with Decentralized Promises Contingent on Vote Outcome Show Chinese title

Title: 基于投票结果的去中心化承诺的民主政策决策

Abstract: We study pre-vote interactions in a committee that enacts a welfare-improving reform through voting. Committee members use decentralized promises contingent on the reform enactment to influence the vote outcome. Equilibrium promises prevent beneficial coalitional deviations and minimize total promises. We show that multiple equilibria exist, involving promises from high- to low-intensity members to enact the reform. Promises dissuade reform opponents from enticing the least enthusiastic reform supporters to vote against the reform. We explore whether some recipients of the promises can be supporters of the reform and discuss the impact of polarization on the total promises. Show Chinese abstract

Abstract: 我们研究委员会在通过投票实施有利于福利的改革前的互动。 委员会成员使用与改革实施相关的去中心化承诺来影响投票结果。 均衡承诺防止有益的联盟偏离并最小化总承诺。 我们表明存在多个均衡，涉及从高到低强度成员的承诺以实施改革。 承诺阻止改革反对者引诱最不积极的改革支持者投票反对改革。 我们探讨某些承诺接受者是否可以成为改革的支持者，并讨论极化对总承诺的影响。